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NEW REMEDIES FOR DEFECTIVE
AUTOMOBILE PURCHASERS: A PROPOSAL
FOR A MODEL LEMON LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
The automobile is the major consumer product purchased in America
today. In 1983, Americans spent $65.2 billion on the purchase of new
automobiles.' For sixty-five percent of American families, the automobile is
the second-most expensive item they will ever purchase (only a house is a
greater expense).' For fifteen percent of American families the automobile
is the most expensive item ever purchased.3 These figures indicate the im-
portance of the automobile in our society-indeed, the car is an essential
part of our lives. Due to the need for daily personal transportation, many
Americans are willing to invest a substantial portion of their income in the
purchase of an automobile on which they can rely. However, the high price
we pay for our automobiles does not guarantee that we will be satisfied with
the product.
Unfortunately, consumers have more complaints concerning new cars
than any other consumer product purchased.' A 1984 study determined
that, in the first year of ownership, 33.6 percent of all new cars have at
least one substantial problem covered by a warranty and 14.5 percent have
multiple problems.5 Recent studies verify these findings.6 While manufac-
turer's warranties are designed to correct these problems during the war-
1. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 587 (1985).
2. AUTOMOBILE WARRANT AND REPAIR ACT: HEARINGS ON H.R. 1005 BEFORE THE
SUBCOMM. ON CONSUMER PROTECTION AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1979) (statement of Rep. Bill Eck-
hardt, bill sponsor).
3. Id. at 15-16.
4. Pertschuk, Consumer Automobile Problems, 11 U.C.C. L.J. 145 (1978) (statistics
based on complaints received by the FTC).
5. Towers, Lemon Law Legislation, TRIAL, Dec. 1987, at 74. This study, conducted by
an independent marketing firm, Market Facts of Washington, D.C., was based on a survey of
6,418 consumers.
6. The most recent study by J.D. Power & Associates (31225 LaBaya Drive, West-
lake Village, CA 91362), the leading car industry analyst, found that Japanese cars suffer
from 27 % fewer mechanical problems than U.S. cars and that the average U.S. car has nearly
two reports of mechanical defects in the first ninety days after purchase. Miller, Why Image
Counts: A Tale of Two Industries, BUSINESS WEEK, June 8, 1987, at 138-39.
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ranty period without cost to the purchaser, consumers are often dissatisfied
with the warranty process.
According to consumer surveys, dissatisfaction arises from the dealer's
failure to cooperate in warranting repairs, from the dealer's inability to suc-
cessfully repair the defect,7 and from the necessity of having to return cars
repeatedly before obtaining a successful repair.' Purchasers of cars which
prove to be "lemons"--cars subject to serious, recurring mechanical
problems that render them practically useless-generally have little re-
course other than repeated attempts to have the car repaired. This is be-
cause automobile manufacturers often disclaim warranties and limit reme-
dies only to repair or replacement of defective parts.9 Consumer groups
representing owners of chronically defective automobiles have successfully
campaigned in forty-three states and the District of Columbia to expand
warranty protection for automobile purchasers.' 0 Lemon laws, as they are
7. Comment, A New Twist for Texas "Lemon" Owners, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 155, 156
(1985) (survey conducted by Consumer Reports reveals dealers' failure to cooperate, and in-
ability to successfully repair, the two most common consumer complaints).
8. Id. at 156.
9. Vogel, Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws, Consumer Warranties, and a Proposal
for Reform, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 589, 591. An example of the standard manufacturer's new
car limited warranty in pertinent part reads:
New Vehicle Limited Warranty
Ford Motor Company warrants that your selling Dealer will repair, replace, or ad-
just parts, except tires in 1987 Ford Motor Company cars and light trucks, found to be
defective in factory materials or workmanship made or supplied by Ford for the periods
described below. Any Ford or Lincoln-Mercury dealer may perform the repairs if you
have moved, are traveling or need emergency service. . . . The entire vehicle, except
tires, is covered for 12 months or 12,000 miles, whichever occurs earlier. . . (At bottom
of pamphlet) Ford Motor Company does not authorize any person to create for it any
other obligation or liability in connection with these vehicles. To the Extent Allowed by
Law, any Implied Warranty of Merchantibility or Fitness for a Particular Purpose Appli-
cable to these Vehicles is Limited in Duration to the Duration of these Warranties.
Neither Ford Motor Company nor the Selling Dealer shall be Liable for Loss of Time,
Inconvenience, Commercial Loss or Consequential Damages. (Bold print included in
warranty).
Ford Motor Corp., Ford Warranty Information (1987).
10. ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.300 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1261 (1987);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-12-101 (1984
& Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-179(b) (West 1987 & Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 5001 (1974 & Supp. 1988); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-1301 (1986); FLA. STAT. §
681.101 (1966 & West Supp. 1988); HAw. REV. STAT. § 490:2-313.1 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 121- , para. 1201 (1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 322E.1 (1985 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 50-645 (1985 & Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.840 (Baldwin 1986); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1941 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1161
(1980 & Supp. 1987); MD. Com. LAW CODE ANN. § 14:1501 (1983 & Supp. 1987); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90 § 7N 1h (West 1969 & Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.1401
(Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.665 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. §
63-17-151 (1973 & Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.560 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1988);
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commonly called, create powerful new rights and remedies for consumers.
In response to the dramatic increase in consumer warranty law, in
1975 Congress passed the Magnuson-Moss Federal Warranty Act."' The
goal of the Act was to facilitate private enforcement of warranty rights of
consumers by creating a private right of action more generous than under
the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) or other state law.'" The Act re-
quires manufacturers to provide full disclosure of all written warranty
terms in a clear and concise manner. The Act does not apply to new car
purchasers, however, because the Act covers only full warranties, and auto-
mobile manufacturers typically provide only limited warranties.'" There-
fore, the Magnuson-Moss Act covers most consumer products except for
automobiles.
To supplement the Act, many states have enacted provisions known as
"lemon laws."' 4 These laws provide the new car buyer with several advan-
tages over existing law, including the U.C.C. and the Magnuson-Moss
Act.' 5 Most importantly, lemon laws are designed to assure the consumer a
refund or replacement remedy where the manufacturer is unable, within a
reasonable time, to remedy a substantial defect breaching an express
warranty.' 6
MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-4-501 (1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-2701 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 598.751 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-D (1986 & Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
56:12-19 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-16-7 (1987); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 198-a (McKinney 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-16 (1985 & Supp. 1987); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.71 (Baldwin Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 901 (1987); OR.
REV. STAT. § 646.315 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 73, § 1951 (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 31-5.2-1 (1982 & Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § (19xx); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 55-24-101 (1986 & Supp. 1988); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36) (Vernon
1987 & Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-20-1 (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4083
(1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1207.9 (1987); WASH: REV. CODE ANN. § 19.118 (1986 &
Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6A-1 (1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.015 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1987); Wyo. STAT. § 40-17-101 (1987).
11. Magnuson-Moss Act-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2301-12 (1982). The Magnuson-Moss Act was intended "to provide minimum disclosure stan-
dards for written consumer product warranties against defect or malfunction; to define mini-
mum Federal content for such warranties; to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act in
order to improve its consumer protection activities; and for other purposes." H.R. REP. No.
1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7702.
12. Miller & Kanter, Litigation Under Magnuson-Moss: New Opportunities in Private
Actions, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 10 (1980).
13. Note, Lemon Laws: Putting the Squeeze on Automobile Manufacturers, 61 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1125, 1143 (1984). As of 1977, only American Motors Company offered a "full" war-
ranty; AMC's market share was somewhat less then 2% at that time. Pertschuk, supra note 4,
at 149 n.1l.
14. See supra note 10.
15. See infra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
16. Vogel, supra note 9, at 592.
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While most lawyers and consumer advocates agree that consumers are
better off with lemon laws,'7 the lemon laws themselves can be lemons.
Lemon laws are often hard to enforce and the provisions are not broad
enough to ensure that the remedy they were designed to provide will actu-
ally be attainable. 18 Presently, a plethora of different state regulations
causes difficulties for manufacturers because they must abide by regulations
that vary amongst states.19 Furthermore, a lack of definitive, workable stan-
dards leaves the consumer guessing whether his claim will meet the criteria
necessary to bring a claim under the lemon law.20 Although several states
have noted that their lemon laws are in need of revision,2 these states have
not taken the steps necessary to correct the problems.
This. note concludes that current legislation is inadequate to assure a
remedy to the purchaser of a defective new automobile. This note first ex-
plores the ineffectiveness of the traditional options currently available to a
purchaser of a defective automobile, namely the remedies under the Uni-
form Commercial Code and the Magnuson-Moss Federal Warranty Act,
and the problems and shortcomings of each." Second, the note examines
the several advantages that states possess by virtue of having a lemon law.23
Next, several defects of the current state lemon laws are discussed.24 Fi-
nally, changes are suggested which, if adopted, will transform the currently
inadequate lemon laws into effective weapons for both manufacturers and
consumers.
25
II. TRADITIONAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO PURCHASERS OF DEFECTIVE
AUTOMOBILES
The owner of a lemon tends to lose faith in his automobile and wants
either a return of his purchase price or a new car.26 However, the manufac-
17. NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1987, at 1, col. 3.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 25, col. 1. Manufacturers vow to comply with the laws if the "kinks can be
ironed out." Id.
20. For example, the current state statutes are vague as to the definition of noncon-
formity. The following cases suggest various applications of the element of nonconformity:
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117, 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[B]reach of war-
ranty and nonconformity are not entirely congruent concepts; the former being a subset of the
latter."); Atlan Indus. v. O.E.M., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 184, 188 (W.D. Okla. 1983) (plastic
whose melting temperature failed to meet industry standards was nonconforming).
21. A few states have made significant changes to their lemon laws. The changes were
geared to clarifying vague provisions in the original law and correcting problem areas that
surfaced as the law was implemented. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 218.015 (West Supp. 1987).
22. See infra notes 31-96 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 113-51 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 152-94 and accompanying text.
26. See Rigg, Lemon Laws Should be Written to Ensure Broad Scope and Adequate
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turer, having limited the buyer's remedy to repair or replacement of defec-
tive parts through a limited warranty,27 is not likely to comply with either
request.2 8 The consumer is then left with two choices: litigation,2 9 or if
lengthy litigation is too costly, absorbing the loss.30 If the consumer does file
a lawsuit, possible methods of recovery under the U.C.C. include a suit for
breach of warranty,31 or a suit for revocation of acceptance.32 If a full war-
Remedies, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 302, 306 (1983). Consumers who have had repeated
problems with defective cars prefer to sever the relationship with the manufacturer and there-
fore want a refund rather than a replacement vehicle. Id.
27. See supra note 10.
28. See supra note 10; See also Venture v. Ford Motor Corp., 180 N.J. Super. 45, 49,
433 A.2d 801, 804 (1981) (in response to lemon owner's demand for relief, dealer advised
owner that he would have to "live with this one").
29. See Comment, supra note 7, at 158. See also Whiteford, Law and the Consumer
Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 1006, 1039.
Automobile manufacturers are not overly concerned with adverse judgments because not many
warranty disputes are litigated, "and it is highly unlikely many would [litigate] regardless of
the attitude the manufacturer and dealers took toward warranty obligation. The expense of
legal action is simply too great . . . ." Id. at 1039.
30. See supra note 27. See also Eddy, Effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act upon Con-
sumer Product Warranties, 55 N.C.L. REv. 835, 869-70 (1977) (consumers given "run
around" become frustrated, "drop out," and bear their losses); Note, Incentives for Warrantor
Formation ofInformal Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 236 (1978)
(it is to warrantor's advantage to delay litigation thereby making it too costly for consumers to
pursue a remedy).
31. This remedy exists under three Code sections:
U.C.C. § 2-313 (1980) reads:
(I) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates
to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to
make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement
purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create
a warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1980) reads in part:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (§ 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchanta-
ble is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods
of that kind ...
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade . . . ; and
(b) . . . are of fair average quality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.
U.C.C. § 2-315 (1980) reads:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for
1988]
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ranty is offered on the automobile, relief may also be available under the
Magnuson-Moss Act. 8
A. Uniform Commercial Code
1. Breach of Express Warranty under U.C.C. Section 2-313
Under the U.C.C., the buyer of a defective product may sue for dam-
ages if he establishes the existence and subsequent breach of an express
warranty.u Under U.C.C. Section 2-313(a), an express warranty can be
created by a promise or an affirmation of fact, a sample or model, or a
description of the goods, which becomes a part of the basis of the bargain.3 5
The express warranty can be oral or written, and specific words such as
"guarantee" or "warranty" are not required.3 1
The manufacturer's standard new car express warranty warrants only
certain parts and disclaims all implied warranties.37 If a defective part is
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judg-
ment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the
next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
32. This remedy if found in U.C.C. § 2-608 (1980), which reads:
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-
conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity if his acceptance was rea-
sonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's
assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer
discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in
condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until
the buyer notifies the seller of it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods
involved as if he had rejected them.
33. Magnuson-Moss Act,-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2301-12 (1982).
34. Note, A Sour Note: A Look at the Minnesota Lemon Law, 68 MINN. L. REv. 846,
851 (1984).
35. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1980) defines an express warranty. For a complete definition of
express warranty, see supra note 29. See, e.g., AFA Corp. v. Phoenix Closures, Inc., 501 F.
Supp. 224, 228 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (brochure containing statements and samples may constitute
express warranty); Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081, 1093 (N.D. Ohio
1975), modified and affid, 591 F.2d 352, 358 (6th Cir. 1978) (T.V. commercial constituted
express warranty as to safety of chemical product); Crest Container Corp. v. R.H. Bishop Co.,
111 111. App. 3d 1068, 1074, 445 N.E.2d 19, 23-24 (1982) (brochures may constitute express
warranty); Ford Motor Co. v. Lemieux Lumber Co., 418 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967) (pictorial representation in advertising brochure for truck created an express warranty).
36. Id.
37. The U.C.C. recognizes an implied warranty of merchantibility in § 2-314, and an
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in § 2-315. The following provisions, taken
from the 1985 New Car Limited Warranty distributed by American Honda Motor Company,
are typical:
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 [1988], Art. 10
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excluded from the express warranty, and if the implied warranties have
Some states have recently passed laws which give new-car buyers certain rights. Al-
though these laws vary from state to state, they generally say that if a new car has a
major defect (e.g., one that substantially affects its use, value, safety) which can't be
repaired in a reasonable time (generally four attempts to repair the same problem, or out
of service at various times for a total of 30 days), the owner can request a replacement or
a refund. Usually the defect must occur within the first year.
Before making the request, you must explain the problem in writing to our Zone Cus-
tomer Service office and give the dealer and American Honda an opportunity to resolve
it. If we aren't successful, we'll ask you to submit the dispute to Auto Line for mediation
or arbitration.
Of course there are other terms and conditions in these laws. We recommend you check
your own state law if the need arises. Our intent is for you to be satisfied with your
Honda. If you have any questions or problems, please contact your local Honda dealer
first, then the Zone Customer Service office .
TIME AND MILEAGE PERIOD
This warranty begins on the date the car is sold to the first retail purchaser, or the date it
is first used as a demonstrator, lease, or company car, whichever comes first. The car is
covered for 12 months or 12,000 miles (or a maximum of 18 months or 18,000 miles
under a demonstrator warranty extension), whichever come first. The power train (de-
scribed below) is covered for 24 months or 24,000 miles (whichever comes first) for the
date the warranty begins.
WARRANTY COVERAGE
Honda will repair or replace, at its option, any factory-installed part that is defective in
material or factory workmanship under normal use. Normal use excludes any use the
Owner's Manual states is not recommended. Warranty repairs will be made free of
charge for parts and labor, except for the battery, which will be adjusted on a pro-rata
basis . . . . Any repaired or replaced parts are covered only for the remainder of this
warranty. All parts replaced under the warranty become the property of Honda.
POWER TRAIN PARTS COVERED:
Engine: Cylinder Block, head, and Engine Seals
all internal parts. Flywheel
Value train Oil Pump
Manifolds Water Pump
Transaxle: Manual Transmission/differential, and all
internal parts
Automatic transmission/differential, and all internal parts
Driveshafts and CV (constant velocity) joints.
THIS WARRANTY DOES NOT COVER:
Emission control systems (refer to emission control warranty) Tires (refer to the tire
manufacturer's warranty that came with the car). If you have any problems with the
tires, ask your Honda dealer for assistance.
Parts that fail due to lack of required maintenance, use of nonequivalent parts, or racing.
Normal wear or deterioration of any part.
Any car registered or normally driven outside of the United States, Puerto Rico, and the
U.S. Virgin Islands.
The replacement of expendable maintenance items when the replacement is not due to a
defect in material or factory workmanship.
Any car on which the odometer has been altered, or on which the actual mileage cannot
be determined.
Adjustments, unless made as part of a warranty repair.
Accessories . . ..
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been effectively disclaimed,"8 the buyer has no cause of action for breach of
warranty. 39 If a defective part is covered in the warranty, however, the
manufacturer is given an opportunity to repair the problem within the
terms of the warranty. ° Arguably, the warranty is not breached provided
the dealer accepts the car for attempted repair.,1
The mere existence of a defect is not a breach of the warranty. When
the selling dealer or the manufacturer fails to fix the defective vehicle
within a reasonable time, some courts have held that the limited remedy of
repair or replacement of parts has "failed of its essential purpose" under
U.C.C. Section 2-719(2)"' and therefore constitutes a breach of warranty.
In other words, if the warrantor cannot replace the parts or repair them to
conform to the warranty, then the defect cannot be cured. However, the
warranty does not specify how many times the seller must attempt to cor-
rect the defect before a reasonable opportunity to repair or replace has
passed."'
In Koperski v. Husker Dodge, Inc.,"4 a Nebraska court found that the
alleged defects in the car did not substantially impair the vehicle's value
even though the car vibrated when traveling 35 to 40 miles per hour, its
motor stopped whenever the air conditioner was running, and its engine
stalled whenever the transmission shifted into reverse. 5 The buyer, Koper-
ski, alleged that the manufacturer had breached its warranty agreement
with her because repeated attempts to fix her automobile were unsuccessful.
She sought rescission of the contract and revocation of her acceptance of
DISCLAIMER OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES AND LIMITATIONS OF IM-
PLIED WARRANTIES
Honda disclaims any responsibility for loss of time or use of the parts or vehicle in which
the parts are installed, transportation or any other incidental or consequential damage;
any implied warranties, including the implied warranty of merchantibility, are limited to
the duration of this written warranty.
Some states do not allow limitations on how long an implied warranty lasts, or the exclu-
sion or limitation of incidental or consequential damages, so the above limitations or ex-
clusions may not apply to you.
This warranty gives you specific legal rights, and you may also have other rights which
vary from state to state.
American Honda Motor Company, 1985 New Car Limited Warranty.
38. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1980).
39. Comment, Buyer's Remedies for a Defective Automobile: The U.C.C. Versus the
Oklahoma Lemon Law, 21 TULSA L.J. 318, 335 (1985).
40. Comment, L.B. 155: Nebraska's "'Lemon Law", Synthesizing Remedies for the
Owner of a "Lemon", 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 345, 353 (1984).
41. McEttrick, Defective Motor Vehicles: The Massachusetts Lemon Law and Recent
Used Car Cases under Chapter 93A, 70 MAss. L. REV. 30, 31 (1985).
42. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1980).
43. Comment, supra note 39, at 336.
44. 208 Neb. 29, 302 N.W.2d 655 (1982).
45. Id. at 33, 302 N.W.2d at 658-59.
[Vol. 23
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the car. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the warranty had not
failed of its essential purpose because repair work was performed on the
vehicle each time it was returned for servicing.46
The Koperski case illustrates the problems that a consumer faces when
seeking a remedy under the U.C.C.. No set standard exists as to how many
attempts the seller must be given to try to repair the problem before the
limited warranty fails of its essential purpose, or as to what constitutes
"substantial impairment" to let the buyer revoke his acceptance.47
2. Revocation of Acceptance under U.C.C. Section 2-608
If the essential purpose of the automobile's limited warranty fails,
U.C.C. Section 2-719(2) provides that the full range of remedies under
other sections of the U.C.C. are available to the buyer.4 1 One of these rem-
edies is U.C.C. Section 2-608, 49 which governs the revocation of the buyer's
acceptance.
50
If the owner of a lemon believes that his warranty has failed of its
essential purpose, he will most likely seek to revoke his acceptance of the
defective automobile .5 Revocation permits a buyer to receive a full refund
of his automobile purchase price if certain stated events are established.5 1
46. Id. at 33, 302 N.W.2d at 658.
47. Note, supra note 40, at 356.
48. U.C.C. § 2-719 (1980).
49. U.C.C. § 2-608 (1980). See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
50. Durfee v. Rod Baxtor Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn. 1978). See also
Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 180 N.J. Super. 45, 55, 433 A.2d 801, 810 (1981) which states:
We are dealing with a breach of an express contractual obligation. Nothing prevents us
from granting an adequate remedy under state law for that breach of contract, including
rescission when appropriate. Under state law the right to revoke acceptance for defects
substantially impairing the value of the product (N.J.S.A. 12A:2-608) and to receive a
refund of the purchase price (N.J.S.A. 12A:2-71 1) are rights available to a buyer against
a seller in privity. Where the manufacturer gives a warranty to induce the sale it is
consistent to allow the same type of remedy as against the manufacturer.
Id. See also Note, Rescission of Consumer's Purchase of Automobile Permitted Upon Breach
of Limited Warranty - Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 180 N.J. Super. 45, 433 A.2d 80
(1981), 12 SETON HALL 414, 416 (1982).
51. See, e.g., Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 172 Conn. 112, 118, 374 A.2d
144, 149 (1976); Adams v. J.1. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 403, 261 N.E.2d 1, 8 (1970);
Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480, 483-84 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). Courts do not always
explain why the remedy fails of its essential purpose. A likely reason for this omission is that
courts are using the doctrine of failure of essential purpose because they do not think the
remedy limitation is fair in the first place. If the remedy limitation is unfair at the time of the
contract, then it is more appropriate to find that it is unconscionable, courts have obviously
found failure of essential purpose a less controversial way to accomplish the purpose. Eddy, On
the "'Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of U.C.C. § 2-719(2), 65
CALIF. L. REV. 28, 58-84 (1977).
52. In order to successfully revoke acceptance, the nonconformity must substantially
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Buyers who wish to recover the full purchase price of their vehicles have
been more successful using the theory of revocation of acceptance than war-
ranty theories.53 Upon revocation, the purchaser is entitled to recover the
purchase price" and any other damages arising as a result of the seller's
breach.
55
The right to revoke is recognized and limited under Section 2-608 of
the Code.56 In order to revoke, the buyer must establish that the defect in
the goods "substantially impairs" their value to him.57 Whether such sub-
stantial impairment of value exists is generally a question of fact.58 The
multitude of potential factual problems prevents formulating any clear test
for substantial impairment.51
In addition to the requirement of substantial impairment, two other
potential barriers might prevent revocation recovery. First, the buyer's ac-
ceptance must have been based on either the reasonable assumption that
the nonconformity would be cured,"' or the buyer must have accepted the
goods without discovery of the defect and prove that his acceptance was
reasonably induced by the difficulty of discovering the defect before accept-
ance, or by the seller's assurances.6 ' Second, in order to be justifiable, a
revocation must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or
should have discovered the grounds for it,62 and the revocation is not effec-
tive until the buyer notifies the seller of the revocation. 3 The buyer's right
to revoke under Section 2-608 generally is read as applying only against the
"seller" with whom the buyer has contracted, generally meaning the
impair the value of the vehicle, and the revocation must occur "within a reasonable time after
the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial
change in condition of the vehicle." U.C.C. § 2-608 (1980). Usually in the context of new car
sales, before revoking, the buyer must first submit to the dealer's efforts to repair the car
pursuant to the manufacturer's express warranty. Basanta, infra note 82 at 12.
53. Comment, Sweetening the Fate of the "'Lemon" Owner: California and Connecticut
Pass Legislation Dealing with Defective New Cars, 14 U. TOL. L. REv. 341, 351 n.76 (1983).
54. U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (1980).
55. Id. Such damages include "the difference between the market price at the time
when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental and
consequential damages provided in this Article (§ 2-715), but less expenses saved in conse-
quence of the seller's breach." U.C.C. § 2-713(l).
56. U.C.C. § 2-608 (1980). See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
57. U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (1980). See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
58. See Erling v. Homera, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 478, 481 (N.D. 1980); Frontier Mobile
Home Sales, Inc. v. Trigleth, 256 Ark. 101, 103-04, 505 S.W.2d 516, 517 (1974).
59. U.C.C. § 2-608(1)(a), (b) (1980).
60. Robertson, Rights and Obligations of Buyers with Respect to Goods in Their Pos-
session After Rightful Rejection or Justifiable Revocation of Acceptance, 60 IND. L.J. 663,
670 (1985).
61. Id.
62. U.C.C. § 2-608(2) (1980).
63. Id.
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dealer." The majority of courts have denied claims for revocation under
Section 2-608 against remote manufacturers. 5
Because most dealers do not give any express warranties, and often
effectively disclaim all implied warranties, the car buyer is usually pre-
cluded from revoking acceptance from the dealer on the basis of the failure
of the car to conform to the manufacturer's express warranty.66 In such a
case, the buyer's only course of action may be under the manufacturer's
express warranty.67
If the buyer is able to effectively revoke, he is entitled to damages as
specified under U.C.C. Section 2-711(1).68 Thus, the buyer can cancel the
contract and recover any amounts already paid. He may then either recover
the additional costs for a substitute car under Section 2-71269 or the mar-
ket-contract price difference under Section 2-713. 70 The buyer may also re-
64. 4 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-608:101 (3d ed. 1983).
65. See Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 172 Conn. 112, 374 A.2d 144 (1976);
Wright v. O'Neal Motors, Inc., 57 N.C. App. 49, 291 S.E.2d 165, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 393,
294 S.E.2d 221 (1982); Clark v. Ford Motor Co., 46 Or. App. 521, 621 P.2d 316 (1980). But
see Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 1982); Durfee v. Rod Baxter
Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Novak, 418 So.
2d 801 (Miss. 1982). See also Comment, Uniform Commercial Code: Buyers of Nonconform-
ing Goods Who Revoke Acceptance Under Section 2-608 May Recover the Purchase Price
from a Remote Supplier Despite lack of Privity of Contract, 63 MINN. L. REV. 665 (1979).
66. See, e.g., Crume v. Ford Motor Co., 60 Or. App. 224, 653 P.2d 564 (1982); Clark
v. Ford Motor Co., 46 Or. App. 521, 612 P.2d 316 (1980). But see Blankenship v. Northtown
Ford, Inc., 95 I11. App. 3d 303, 420 N.E.2d 167 (4th Dist. 1981).
67. Comment, supra note 53, at 346.
68. U.C.C. § 2-711(1) reads as follows:
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or
justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods involved, and with respect to
the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (§ 2-612), the buyer may cancel and
whether or not he has done so may in addition to recovering so much of the price as has
been paid:
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to all the goods affected whether
or not they have been identified to the contract; or
(b) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this Article (§ 2-713).
Id. See also McEttrick, supra note 41, at 31; Comment, supra note 39, at 329.
69. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
70. U.C.C. § 2-712 and 2-713 read as follows:
§ 2-712. "Cover"; Buyer's Procurement of Substitute Goods
(1) After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may "cover" by making in
good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to
purchase goods in substitution of those due from the seller.
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between the cost of
cover and the contract price together with any incidental or consequential damages as
hereinafter defined (§ 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's
breach.
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar him from any
other remedy.
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cover incidental and consequential damages under Section 2-71571 when
appropriate.
Two critical issues which the U.C.C. does not resolve involve the kinds
of defects that permit revocation and the issue of when revocation is neither
premature nor too late.72 Use of the implied warranty of merchantability
provision under Section 2-316(a)7 3 does not provide an easy solution either.
Deciding what is "merchantable" under Section 2-3147" is to struggle with
the same issues: "Merchantable" means "of fair average quality" and "fit
for the ordinary purposes for which such good are used. 17 5 The above words
Id., § 2-712.
§ 2-713. Buyer's Remedies for Non-Delivery or Repudiation
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price (§ 2-
723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller is the differ-
ence between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the
contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages provided in this
Article (§ 2-715) but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of rejection
after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival.
Id., § 2-713.
71. U.C.C. § 2-715 reads as follows:
§ 2-715 Buyer's Incidental and Consequential Damages
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses reasona-
bly incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation, and care and custody of goods right-
fully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connec-
tion with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other
breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include:
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirement and needs of which the
seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be
prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.
Id. § 2-715. See, e.g., McGrady v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 46 Il1. App. 3d 136, 360 N.E.2d 818
(1977). The standard warranty excludes consequential and incidental damages. R. BILLINGS,
HANDLING AUTOMOBILE WARRANTY AND REPOSSESSION CASES § 6.8 (1984).
72. See supra notes 48-70.
73. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1980) provides:
Subject to Subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability
or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing
must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclu-
sion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of
fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend
beyond the description on the face hereof."
U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1980). "
74. Most litigation under the statute concerns the meaning of merchantability. Of the
numerous definitions in the statute, the one most applicable is that the goods must be "fit for
the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." Burnham, Remedies Available to the
Purchaser of a Defective Used Car, 47 MONT. L. REV. 273, 287 (1986).
75. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(b), (c) (1980).
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can only be defined through litigation."8 The leading case where recovery of
the full purchase price was permitted, Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith,
77
demonstrates the rigorous burden generally required for the buyer to re-
cover on a theory of revocation of acceptance. In Zabriskie, the court held
that once the purchaser's faith in the automobile's integrity and reliability
is shaken, its value to him is substantially impaired.7 8 The "shaken faith"
standard has become one by which many courts measure "substantial im-
pairment" in automobile revocation cases.7 9 The majority of state courts
view substantial impairment in value as a subjective test, i.e., whether the
value to the particular buyer was substantially impaired.80 Comment 2 to
U.C.C. Section 2-608 appears to confirm this subjective test: "[T]he ques-
tion is whether the nonconformity is such as will in fact cause a substantial
impairment of value to the buyer though the seller had no advance knowl-
edge as to the buyer's particular circumstances." '
While the U.C.C. does provide the new car buyer with some significant
protections, the U.C.C. suffers from a variety of substantive deficiencies.
Car manufacturers are able to disclaim warranties and limit remedies.8 2
Definitional problems, such as "failure of its essential purpose" frustrate
76. McEttrick, supra note 41, at 33.
77. 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
78. Id. at 458, 240 A.2d at 205. In Zabriskie, the transmission in the plaintiff's car
failed in its first trip home from the showroom. The plaintiffs notified the dealer of their revo-
cation within 24 hours and stopped payment on their check. The plaintiffs refused to attempt
further operation of the car, and the car was towed back to the dealer, who sued them for the
purchase price. The plaintiffs declined the seller's offer to "cure" the defect by replacing the
defective transmission with a used transmission. Id. at 444, 240 A.2d at 197-98.
79. See, e.g., Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 44 Il1. App. 3d 530, 358 N.E.2d 382
(1976); Asciolla v. Manter Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc., 117 N.H. 85, 370 A.2d 270 (1977). But
see Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., 227 Va. 154, 313 S.E.2d 384 (1984).
80. See Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 292, 224 So. 2d 638, 645 (1969)
([w]hat may cause one person great inconvenience or financial loss, may not another); Keen v.
Modern Trailer Sales, 40 Colo. App. 527, 529, 578 P.2d 668, 670 (1978) (this section creates
a subjective test in the sense that the requirements of the particular buyer must be examined
and deferred to); Peckham v. Larsen Chevrolet-Buick-Oldsmobile, Inc., 99 Idaho 675, 680,
587 P.2d 816, 820 (1978) (each case must be examined on its own merits to determine what is
a substantial impairment of value to the particular buyer); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc.,
262 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Minn. 1977). Cf. Asciolla v. Manter Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc., 117
N.H. 85, 89, 370 A.2d 270, 273 (1977) (interpreting 2-608 to create a subjective test that
views the buyer's needs and circumstances, but then adds the twist of having the trier-of-fact
objectively decide whether the value of the goods to the buyer was in fact substantially
impaired).
81. U.C.C. § 2-608 comment 2 (1980). But see Koperski v. Hunter Dodge, 208 Neb.
29, 302 N.W.2d 655 (1981), where the Nebraska Supreme Court ignored both the prevailing
interpretation of the patent language of the comment to § 2-608 and viewed the fact that
approximately 85% of the purchase price was received upon sale of the vehicle after reposses-
sion as supportive of the trail court's opinion that there was no substantial impairment.
82. Basanta, The Illinois New Car Buyer Protection Act - An Analysis and Evalua-
tion of the Illinois Lemon Law, 1984 So. ILL. L.J. 1, 14.
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claims.8" Revocation of acceptance is subject to many restrictions.8' Finally,
litigation expenses are often prohibitive for many consumers.8 5 The Federal
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act8s has attempted to solve these problems,
but with only limited success.87
B. The Federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act-Federal Trade Commission Im-
provement Act,8 passed by Congress in 1975, establishes federal minimum
standards for "full" consumer product warranties. 9 The Act is remedial in
nature and is primarily designed to protect consumers from deceptive war-
ranty practices." In furtherance of this goal, Congress designed the Act to
meet four specific needs: (1) consumer understanding of warranties; (2)
minimum warranty protection for consumers; (3) assurance of warranty
performance; and (4) improved liability for defects. 1
Under a full warranty,92 the consumer is entitled to elect either a re-
83. Id. In finding a failure of essential purpose, some courts state that "at some point
in time, it must be obvious to all people that a particular vehicle simply cannot be repaired or
parts replaced so that the same is made free from defect. Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d
670, 673 n.5 (5th Cir. 1971) (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Earnest, 279 Ala. 299, 184 So.
2d 811 (1966)).




88. 15 U.S.C. § 2301-12 (1982).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(1) (1982), provides that a written warranty meeting the mini-
mum standards set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 2304 "shall be conspicuously designated a 'full (state-
ment of duration) warranty'." All other written warranties must be designated "limited" under
§ 2303(a)(2). The Act does not mandate written warranties for consumer products, nor does it
require full warranties. It merely requires that if a written warranty is offered, it must be
designated "full" or "limited."
90. Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 974 (1982).
91. Swanson, Comparative Analysis of Three Lemon Laws, 75 ILL. B.J. 436 (1987).
For a clear, concise analysis of the Act, see also Miller & Kanter, supra note 12, at 10.
92. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. In order to qualify for designation as a
"full" warranty under the act, certain minimum criteria must be met as follows:
(a) In order for a warrantor warranting a consumer product by means of a written war-
ranty to meet the Federal minimum standards for warranty:
(1) such warrantor must, at a minimum, remedy such consumer product within a rea-
sonable time and without charge, in the case of a defect, malfunction, or failure to con-
form with such written warranty;
(2) notwithstanding section 2308, such warrantor may not impose any limitation on the
duration of any implied warranty on the product;
(3) such warrantor may not exclude or limit consequential damages for breach of any
written or implied warranty on such product, unless such exclusion or limitation conspic-
uously appears on the face of the warranty; and
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fund or a replacement without charge if, after a reasonable number of at-
tempts, the warrantor is unable to repair the nonconforming product.93 The
Act is thus a federal lemon law that protects buyers with goods having a
full warranty. Though the Act does not require the manufacturer to provide
a written warranty, all four major American automobile manufacturers do
so.9' However, most automobiles are purchased under a limited warranty
and therefore are not subject to the Magnuson-Moss Act. 5 Therefore, a
buyer with a limited warranty receives no protection under the Act and
must resort to other methods such as successfully revoking acceptance,96 or
seeking a replacement under a particular state lemon law.9"
Even though the Magnuson-Moss Act was designed to give broader
protection to consumers who did not meet the requirements for a claim
under the U.C.C., the Act does not adequately supply new car buyers a
sufficient remedy. Therefore, the benefits that the Act provides to new car
purchasers are very nominal.
Despite its weaknesses, the Magnuson-Moss Act does offer potential,
although not mandatory, protection to the buyer of a lemon with a limited
warranty. First, the Act encourages manufacturers to offer informal dispute
resolution mechanisms.9" If the informal dispute resolution procedure meets
Federal Trade Commission (F.T.C.) standards,99 the manufacturer may in-
clude in the warranty a requirement that the consumer resort to the infor-
mal dispute resolution procedure before bringing a civil action.' 0 Second,
implied warranties may not be disclaimed or modified if the warrantor
makes a written warranty or enters into a service contract with the con-
sumer at the time of sale or ninety days thereafter.1"" The duration of the
implied warranty may only be limited to the duration of a limited war-
ranty.10 2 Third, the Act provides that the court may, at its discretion, award
costs and expenses, including attorney fees, to the consumer who prevails in
(4) if the product (or a component part thereof) contains a defect or malfunction after a
reasonable number of attempts by the warrantor to remedy defects or malfunctions in
such product, such warrantor must permit the consumer to elect either a refund for, or
replacement without charge of, such product or part (as the case may be).
15 U.S.C. § 2304 (1982).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (1978).
94. See Comment, An Empirical Study of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 31
STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1979).
95. Comment, supra note 39, at 337 n.140.
96. Id. at 337.
97. Id. at 337 n.143.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (1982).
99. Id. § 2310(a)(2) (1982); 16 C.F.R. § 703.1-.8 (1984).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(2), (3). The F.T.C. rules appear at 16 C.F.R. § 7043 (1985).
101. Id. § 2308(a) (1978).
102. Id. § 2308(b). Under a full warranty the duration of implied warranties may not be
limited. Id. § 2304(a)(2).
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actions under the Act or under a warranty governed by the Act.103
III. RESPONSES TO U.C.C. AND MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT
SHORTCOMINGS-STATE LEMON LAWS
A. Operative Provisions and Similarities of Current State Lemon Laws
In 1982, Connecticut adopted the first lemon law,""4 and California
followed with its lemon law the same year.105 These two states' statutes
have served as the model for the forty-two states that have followed the
trend by passing state lemon laws.
The advent of lemon law legislation has created an additional remedy
for purchasers of new lemon automobiles. 06 Lemon laws provide the new
car buyer with several important advantages over prior law, including the
U.C.C. and the Magnuson-Moss Federal Warranty Act. 0 7 Most impor-
tantly, the laws are designed to assure the consumer a repair or replace-
ment remedy when the manufacturer, through its dealers, is unable within
a reasonable time to remedy a substantial defect breaching an express war-
ranty.108 Further, the laws set an objective standard to determine when a
manufacturer has had a reasonable opportunity to remedy any defect (a
problem area under prior law).109 Finally, by encouraging the use of non-
judicial dispute resolution mechanisms, lemon laws potentially allow con-
sumers a less expensive and less time-consuming alternative to litigation in
resolving problems concerning new cars." 0
Although state-by-state variations exist, most state lemon laws share
common characteristics."' First, lemon laws usually apply to new motor
vehicles purchased for personal, family, or household purposes. Motor
homes and motorcycles are generally excluded."" Second, lemon laws es-
tablish a period of statutory coverage that normally extends from the
103. Id. § 2310(d)(2).
104. 1982 Conn. Pub. Acts 82-287, amended by Conn. Pub. Acts 87-522. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 42-172 (West Supp. 1988).
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2 (West Supp. 1988).
106. Basanta, supra note 82, at 18.
107. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
108. Basanta, supra note 82, at 18.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Coffinberger & Samuels, Legislative Responses to the Plight of New Car Purchas-
ers, 18 U.C.C. L.J. 168, 176 (1985).
112. Personal, family, or household use is not an unusual limiting provision for a con-
sumer protection statute. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1982). Many
statutes restrict coverage of their Unfair Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes to transactions
primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose. J. SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE
ACTS AND PRACTICES § 2.4.4 (1982).
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shorter of two periods: one year from the date of delivery of the vehicle to
the original purchaser or the written warranty period.11 3 Third, lemon laws
require that the manufacturer or dealer must correct a nonconformity that
arises once the consumer satisfies the burden of notifying the manufacturer
or dealer of the defect."
4
When a defect substantially impairs the value or utility of the vehicle
and cannot be repaired after a reasonable number of attempts, 1" 5 the stat-
utes generally specify that the manufacturer must provide either a compa-
rable replacement or a full refund of the purchase price with only a limited
setoff for the fact that the vehicle is now used."18 The statutes define pre-
cisely what constitutes a reasonable number of attempts by the manufac-
turer or dealer to repair a defective vehicle, with the most common stan-
dard being four repair attempts of the same defect," 7 or the vehicle being
out of service for a cumulative total of at least thirty days during the
shorter of the first year or the duration of the express warranty." 8 If a
manufacturer's informal dispute mechanism exists, consumers may not go
to court on the basis of these statutes until they have pursued it. The manu-
facturer's settlement mechanism is only mandatory if it complies with the
provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Act."'
B. Problems with the Current Lemon Laws
Overall, the lemon law movement appears to be a beneficial one for
consumers. However, certain aspects of state lemon laws should be im-
113. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 1202(0 (1983) (12,000 mile limitation);
ARK. REV. STAT. § 44-1262 (1984) (one year after date of sale).
114. Statutes which more clearly limit the consumer's rights by requiring notice of the
defect within some set period have been the subject of some criticism as being potentially
unrealistically restrictive. As an example, assume a car is expressly warranted as being in
"good operating condition" without stating any period of duration. By its terms, this is simply
a representation of the car's quality at the time of sale. It does not extend beyond that time. So
long as the car conforms to such representations at the time of sale, there is not a breach of
warranty for any defects that appear at any time thereafter. See, e.g., Blade v. Sloan, 108 Ill.
App. 2d 397, 248 N.E.2d 142 (1969). A lemon law which requires notice of the defect to the
seller within the duration of such an express warranty provides the consumer virtually no pro-
tection since the warranty's duration is literally momentary.
115. States vary as to what constitutes a reasonable number of attempts, with states
requiring either three or four attempts to repair. NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1987, at 26, col. 2.
116. Moore v. Howard Pontiac-Am., 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972); Staggs v.
Herif Motor Co., 216 Tenn. 104, 390 S.W.2d 245 (1965).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, § 110(a)(3), 15
U.S.C. § 2310(l)(3) (1982). The Federal Trade Commission's regulations are set out in 16
C.F.R. § 703 (1985). Most state lemon laws contain provisions requiring the exhaustion of
informal dispute mechanisms before a cause of action can be brought in state court.
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proved to produce more effective laws. First, lemon laws lack uniform stan-
dards of conduct for dealers and manufacturers. 120 Second, many laws do
not provide for remedies upon breach of an implied warranty. 2 ' Third,
most laws do not provide clear guidelines for informal dispute resolution.'22
Fourth, definitions and terms used in the laws are ambiguous and left open
to a myriad of interpretations by consumers, manufacturers, arbiters, and
the judicial system. 23
1. Lack of Uniform Standards of Conduct
Generally, the consumer's main objective when dealing with a perpetu-
ally defective automobile is either to receive a refund of the purchase price
or to obtain a new automobile.124 Even though lemon laws are designed to
ensure the availability of such remedies, the desired result is often not
reached.125 The cooperation of the manufacturer is necessary for the statute
to work effectively.
1 26
The forty-four lemon laws currently in effect vary in their terms. The
basic framework of the statutes, however, is the same, with each statute
designed to reach the same end result-refund or replacement."2 ' However,
the differing operative provisions of the statutes cause difficulties for manu-
facturers. This results in both the manufacturer's failure to comply with the
statutes, and companies and industry associations challenging a number of
the laws in court.128 States, frustrated by what they see as resistance by
manufacturers to respond to lemon laws, have also filed their own legal
challenges. 129 Consistency in the substantive provisions of lemon laws could
help alleviate some of this friction.
Current lemon laws also vary in their substantive provisions. 30 For ex-
120. See infra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
124. Note, supra note 40, at 350.
125. See Note, supra note 34, at 846 (despite the publicity and enthusiasm over lemon
laws, most of their benefits are illusory).
126. Id.
127. NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1987, at 25, col. 1.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Connecticut, which recently amended its lemon laws extensively, was the first state
to pass such a statute, followed by California. While most of the state lemon laws are very
similar, some differ substantially from others. The California law applies in part to consumer
goods other than automobiles. Kentucky's lemon law requires the use of a dispute resolution
mechanism, but unlike most, does not provide the consumer with a refund-or-replacement rem-
edy. The Washington lemon law only provides for a refund to the consumer, not for a replace-
ment alternative. North Carolina simply changes the Uniform Commercial Code's definition of
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ample, in some states only personal vehicles are covered by the terms of the
law, whereas in other states commercial vehicles are also covered."' 1 The
maximum number of repair attempts allowed to cure the same defect is
generally split between three attempts in some states and four attempts in
others.1 3 2 The statutory period of coverage ranges from one year or 12,000
miles to the period of the express warranty.13 3 These differences are only
representative of the many variations among the different statutes.
The wide array of statutory provisions currently in effect nationwide
makes it extremely difficult for automotive manufacturers to efficiently han-
dle consumer complaints. 34 Manufacturers claim that they are willing to
comply with lemon laws if they are able, through legislative enactment, to
achieve some uniformity in the rules with which they must comply.' 3 5 If
this uniformity is not achieved, manufacturers claim that they are willing to
support a federal lemon law, but, because there has not yet been federal
enforcement of Magnuson-Moss warranty laws, states have resisted new
federal laws.' 8
2. Lack of Remedies for Breach of an Implied Warranty
Existing lemon laws pertain only to express warranties as defined by
the U.C.C. 3 7-- no express provisions are made for implied warranties. Most
new car warranties limit a consumer's remedies to repair or replacement of
a "seller" to include any manufacturer of a self-propelled motor vehicle who makes an express
warranty. This then eliminates any privity problems for the buyer. While not a true lemon law,
the North Carolina Attorney General considers it to be such. See Manufacturer's Rush to
Create Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 2 NAT'L CONSUMER L. CENTER REP. (WARRANTIES
& ODOMETERS ED.) (NCLC) 6, 8 n.2. (Sept.-Oct. 1983). Given the number and variety of
state lemon laws it would seem to be appropriate to adopt a uniform state lemon law.
131. The coverage of state lemon laws varies widely. Many are narrow in coverage,
excluding motor homes, motorcycles, and other motor vehicles purchased regularly by individ-
ual consumers. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 5001(5) (Supp. 1983). In contrast, some
states provide very broad coverage for their lemon laws. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
1161(3) (West Supp. 1987-88). Many state lemon laws cover only "passenger cars," and by
covering only passenger cars they exclude motorcycles and trucks from coverage. See, e.g., ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 95 , para. 1-147 (1983).
132. For an analysis of the differing provisions of state lemon laws, see NAT'L L.J., Dec.
14, 1987, at 26, col 2.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 27.
136. Id.
137. For the U.C.C.'s definition of express warranty, see supra note 30 and accompany-
ing text. All but four states restrict their lemon law's coverage to express warranties: KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 50-645 (Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7N (West Supp.
1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-D:2 (Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.2-1(A) (Supp.
1987). That means the laws do not cover disclaimers of implied warranties common in auto-
mobile sales agreements.
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any parts that are defective in workmanship or material. 13 8 If the entire car
is defective, or if it is apparent that the car is not fit for the ordinary pur-
pose of driving and there is no one part or group of parts which renders the
car defective, the manufacturer has not breached any express warranty, 8 9
only the implied warranty of merchantability. In such an instance, the con-
sumer is forced to seek remedies for breach of an implied warranty under
the Magnuson-Moss Act of the U.C.C.. Since the consumer is precluded
from proceeding under both the U.C.C. and a lemon law, the consumer
may have to forego a cause of action based on implied warranties.14
3. Clear Guidelines for Independent Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
(IDSM's)
A key part of the current debate over state regulations is Federal
Trade Commission Rule 703, a regulation enacted under Magnuson-Moss
that established informal dispute settlement mechanisms."4 At issue is ex-
actly when the Rule applies to lemon laws."4 At present, no mechanism
exists to determine whether a given dispute settlement mechanism is in sub-
stantial compliance with Rule 703.143 The F.T.C. has not fulfilled its obliga-
tions to audit such mechanisms as provided in the Magnuson-Moss Act."14
Manufacturers have also taken the position that nothing in Rule 703, or
several states' lemon laws, requires a mechanism to consider or award
lemon law relief even if the consumer proves the elements of recovery. 145
The F.T.C. Rule creates guidelines for manufacturers and sellers of all
goods valued at ten dollars or more to set up voluntary dispute resolution
mechanisms, but does not specifically address lemon laws. 146 Under the
Rule, a consumer has to use a manufacturer's dispute resolution program
before he is eligible to go to court under a lemon law or Magnuson-Moss
program if the manufacturer's program meets all of the rules under state
law.14 7 In some cases, if a consumer finds that the company program vio-
lates the standards, the consumer can bypass the informal resolution pro-
cess and go to the state system; but in states with no certified manufac-
turer's program, consumers can go straight to the state system.148
138. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
139. Swanson, supra note 91, at 444.
140. Id. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , para. 1205 (1985).
141. See generally Nicks, Lemon Laws in the U.S.: More Hype than Help, 34 J. CON-
SUMER POL'Y 79, 82 (1986).




146. NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1987, at 27, col 1.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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Thirty-nine states incorporate Rule 703, but to make 703 more appli-
cable to lemon laws, a common understanding of what is required as an
informal dispute resolution device is needed, and the standards must apply
nationwide.14 In that way, state courts faced with a lemon law suit would
know when a consumer must first use a mandatory arbitration program
supplied by a manufacturer.1 50 A state-by-state debate exists as to whether
an independent dispute settlement mechanism is one that must be used by
the consumer prior to instituting a claim in the courts.1 51
4. Clarification of Definitions and Terms
Many statutes fail to give definitions of terms used in their laws which
are prone to ambiguity. 52 Phrases are often used with no explanation of
their meaning and no standard for their application. As a result, manufac-
turers, consumers, and arbiters tend to construe the words of the statutes in
a manner which supports their respective positions in the suit. 5
To establish a prima facie case, the burden of proof is on the consumer
to prove the elements necessary for relief under the lemon law.154 There-
fore, a consumer needs to know what obstacles he must overcome to prevail
in his claim. A lack of mutual understanding between manufacturers and
consumers often leaves the buyer guessing as to whether he actually has a
cause of action.1 55 For example, even when the owner of a defective car
meets the general requirement of having his automobile fixed three times
for the same defect, the defect is required to be one that "substantially
impairs" the use, value, or safety of the vehicle.156 Since a standard is not
defined in the current state statutes to adjudge the meaning of substantial
impairment, the state courts currently utilize a subjective standard.157
Because this subjective standard is applied initially by the manufac-
turer-sponsored independent dispute settlement mechanism arbiters, the
consumer enters the action unaware of the burden of proof that he will be
forced to meet.158 This lack of awareness causes many consumers to live
with their lemon and to forego their possible remedies.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1987, at 27, col. 1.
152. For example, terms such as substantial impairment, nonconformity, and consumer
are all prone to differing definitions.
153. Comment, supra note 39, at 345.
154. McEttrick, supra note 41, at 34.
155. Id.
156. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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IV. A PROPOSAL FOR A MODEL STATE LEMON LAW
This note has criticized the relief that the U.C.C., the Magnuson-Moss
Act, and the current lemon laws provide for purchasers of defective
automobiles. Under current state lemon laws, which were designed to fill
the gaps left by the inadequacy of the U.C.C. and the Magnuson-Moss Act,
the manufacturer is discouraged from complying with the statutes because
of the burden in trying to act under forty-four different sets of laws. The
current statutes also have defects which make recovery for consumers spec-
ulative. As a result, manufacturers have the ability to escape liability under
existing lemon laws. Moreover, consumers, often discouraged by the specu-
lative procedure, often forego remedies presently available to them. To
make the statute an effective tool for defective automobile control, more
definitive standards must be imposed. To achieve such a result, the state
lemon laws should be amended in the following fashion to achieve their
original objectives.
MODEL STATE STATUTE
Chapter _. Motor Vehicle Warranties.
Sec. 1. This chapter applies to all motor vehicles that are sold, leased,
transferred, or replaced by a dealer or manufacturer.
Sec. 2. As used in this chapter, "calendar day" means any day of the
week other than a legal holiday.
Sec. 3. As used in this chapter, "buyer" means any person who, for
purposes other than resale or sublease, enters into an agreement or contract
within (state) for the transfer, lease, or purchase of a motor vehicle covered
under a manufacturer's express or implied warranty.
Sec. 4. As used in this chapter, "manufacturer" means any person
who is engaged in the business of manufacturing motor vehicles, or, in the
case of motor vehicles not manufactured in the United States, any person
who is engaged in the business of importing motor vehicles.159
Sec. 5. As used in this chapter, "motor vehicle" or "vehicle" means
any self-propelled vehicle intended primarily for use and operation on pub-
lic highways and required to be registered or licensed before use or opera-
tion. The term does not include conversion vans, motor homes, farm trac-
tors, and other machines used in the actual production, harvesting, and care
of farm products, road building equipment, truck tractors, road tractors,
motorcycles, mopeds, snowmobiles, or vehicles built primarily for off-road
159. It is the manufacturer and not the dealer who is responsible for providing the re-
fund-or-replacement remedy. See, e.g., ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 121 / para. 1202(e) (1987).





See. 6. As used in this chapter, "nonconformity"'' means any spe-
cific or generic defect or condition or any concurrent combination of defects
or conditions that:
(1) substantially impairs the use, market value, or safety of a
motor vehicle; 62 or
(2) renders the motor vehicle nonconforming to the terms of an
applicable manufacturer's express warranty or implied warranty
of merchantability.'63
Sec. 7. As used in this chapter, "term of protection" means a period
of time that:
(1) begins:
(A) on the date of original delivery of a motor vehicle;
or
(B) in the case of a replacement vehicle provided by a
manufacturer to a buyer under this chapter, on the date of
delivery of the replacement vehicle to the buyer; and
(2) ends the earlier of:
(A) six months after the end of the express warranty pe-
riod; or
(B) three years from original delivery of the vehicle.
Sec. 8. If a motor vehicle suffers from a nonconformity and the buyer
reports the nonconformity within the term of protection to the manufac-
turer of the vehicle, its agent, or its authorized dealer, the manufacturer,
agent, or authorized dealer shall make the repairs that are necessary to
correct the nonconformity, even if the repairs are made after the expiration
of the term of protection.
Sec. 9. (a) A buyer must notify the manufacturer of a claim under
this chapter if the manufacturer has made the disclosure required by sub-
section (b). 64 However, if the manufacturer has not made the required dis-
closure, the buyer is not required to notify the manufacturer of a claim
under this chapter.
160. Such a definition was derived from ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 para. 1203(c)
(1987).
161. This definition of nonconformity was suggested by Basanta, supra note 82, at 29.
162. See infra notes 190-94.
163. See infra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
164. Coffinberger & Samuels, supra note 111, at 172.
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(b) The manufacturer shall clearly and conspicuously dis-
close to the buyer, in the warranty or owner's manual, that
written notification of the nonconformity is required before
the buyer may be eligible for a refund or replacement of
the vehicle. The manufacturer shall include with the war-
ranty or owner's manual the name and address to which
the buyer must send notification.
Sec. 10. If, after a reasonable number of attempts, 65 the manufac-
turer, its agent, or authorized dealer is unable to correct the nonconformity,
the manufacturer shall accept the return of the vehicle from the buyer and,
at the buyer's option, 6' either refund the amount paid by the buyer or
provide a replacement vehicle of comparable value.
Sec. 11. (a) If a refund is tendered under this chapter, the refund
must be the full contract price of the vehicle, including all credits and al-
lowances for any trade-in vehicle and less a reasonable allowance for use.
(b) To determine a reasonable allowance for use, multiply:
(1) the total contract price of the vehicle; by
(2) a fraction having as its denominator one hundred
thousand (100,000) and having as its numerator the
number of miles that the vehicle traveled before the
manufacturer's acceptance of its return.167
(c) The refund must also include reimbursement for the
following incidental costs:168
(1) All sales tax.
(2) The unexpended portion of the registration fee
and excise tax that has been prepaid for any calendar
year.
(3) All finance charges actually expended.
(4) The cost of all options added by the authorized
165. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
166. Vogel, supra note 9, at 618 n.148. Only six states explicitly state that the consumer
has this choice. Four other states require that the replacement vehicle satisfy the customer.
Other states give the manufacture a choice, and even others do not clearly state who has the
option. Id.
167. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325 F.665(3)(a) (West Supp. 1988) (such a
formula minimizes for the consumer the risk of controversy in connection with an exercise of
rights under the lemon law and make it a more effective device.)
168. Collateral charges include taxes, registration and license fees, finance charges, and
costs of options added by an authorized dealer. It also includes incidental damages incurred
during periods when the car is out of service by reason of repair.




Sec. 12. (a) If a vehicle is replaced by a manufacturer under this
chapter, the manufacturer shall reimburse the buyer for any fees for the
transfer of registration of any sales tax incurred by the buyer as a result of
replacement.
(b) If a replaced vehicle was financed by the manufac-
turer, its subsidiary, or agent, the manufacturer, subsidi-
ary, or agent may not require the buyer to enter into any
refinancing agreement concerning a replacement vehicle
that would create any financial obligations upon the buyer
beyond those of the original financing agreement.
Sec. 13. Whenever a vehicle is replaced or refunded under this chap-
ter, the manufacturer shall reimburse the buyer for necessary towing and
rental costs actually incurred as a direct result of the nonconformity.
Sec. 14. A buyer has the option of retaining the use of any vehicle
returned under this chapter until the time that the buyer has been tendered
a full refund or replacement vehicle of comparable value.' 69 The use of any
vehicle retained by a buyer after its return to a manufacturer under this
chapter must, in cases in which a refund is tendered, be reflected in the
reasonable allowance for use required by Section 11 of this chapter.
Sec. 15. A reasonable number of attempts is considered to have been
undertaken to correct a nonconformity if.'70
(a)(1) the nonconformity has been subject to repair at
least three (3)171 times by the manufacturer or its agents
169. A difficulty with the replacement option in most current state lemon laws is that
they grant great discretion to the manufacturer in selecting the replacement vehicle. Most of
the lemon laws use terms such as "comparable new motor vehicle," "new motor vehicle" or
"motor vehicle of equal value." The following statutes use the term "comparable vehicle."
ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.300 (1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-12-103(1) (1984); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 490:2-313.1(b) (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 322E.1(3) (West Supp. 1987); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 50-645(2)(c) (Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1163(2) (Supp.
1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.665(3)(a) (West Supp. 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-17-
151 (Supp. 1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 598.766.1(a) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-21(a)
(West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-16A-3(B) (1987); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-1(c)
(McKinney 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-18(1) (Supp. 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §
1955 (Purdon Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-24-203(a) (Supp. 1988); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07(c) (Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-20-4
(1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 218.015(2)(b) (West Supp. 1987). The replacement vehicle not
only has to be comparable, but it must also reasonably satisfy the customer.
170. Similar provisions can be found in Maryland, Minnesota, and West Virginia's
Lemon Laws. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 14.1502(c)(i) (Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
325 F.665(3)(c) (West Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE § 46-A-6A-3(b) (1987).
171. Many states' laws only create a presumption as to a reasonable opportunity to cor-
1988]
Rau: New Remedies for Defective Automobile Purchasers:  A Proposal for
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1988
170 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
or authorized dealers, but the nonconformity continues to
exist; or
(2) the vehicle is out of service by reason of repair of
any nonconformity for a cumulative total of thirty
(30) calendar1 2 days; or
(3) there have been five (5) or more attempts to re-
pair any nonconformities that together substantially




(b) The thirty (30) calendar days in subsection (a)(2)
shall be extended by any period of time during which re-
pair services are not available as a direct result of a strike.
The manufacturer, its agent, or authorized dealer shall
provide or make provisions for the free use of a vehicle to
any buyer whose vehicle is out of service by reason of re-
pair during a strike.
(c) The burden is on the manufacturer to show that the
reason for an extension under subsection (b) was the direct
cause for the failure of the manufacturer, its agent, or au-
thorized dealer to cure any nonconformity during the time
of the event.
Sec. 16. (a) A manufacturer, its agent, or authorized dealer may not
refuse to diagnose or repair any vehicle for the purpose of avoiding liability
under this chapter.
(b) A manufacturer, its agent, or authorized dealer shall
provide a buyer with a written repair order each time the
buyer's vehicle is brought in for examination or repair.
The repair order must indicate all work performed on the
vehicle including examination of the vehicle, parts, and
labor.
Sec. 17. If a motor vehicle has been returned to the manufacturer
under either this chapter or by judgment, decree, arbitration award, settle-
rect nonconformities, and the manufacturer can seek to show that the number of repair at-
tempts or days out of service, although in excess of the statutory specifications, are not unrea-
sonable. Since this creates uncertainty and possible conflict, the proposed lemon law
conclusively specifies a reasonable number of repair attempts instead of simply creating a
presumption.
172. Allowing thirty calendar days out of service to be the statutory standard is more
equitable to the consumer than allowing thirty business days to be the statutory standard,
which is too generous to the seller. National Law Center, supra note 89, at 1154.
173. See infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
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ment agreement, or voluntary agreement in (state) or any state, the motor
vehicle may not be resold in (state) unless: 74
(1) The manufacturer provides the same express warranty the
manufacturer provided to the original purchaser, except that the
term of the warranty need only last for twelve thousand
(12,000) miles or twelve (12) months after the date of resale;
and
(2) the manufacturer provides a written disclosure, signed by
the buyer, indicating that the vehicle was returned to the manu-
facturer because of a nonconformity not cured within a reasona-
ble time as provided by (state) law.
Sec. 18. It is an affirmative defense to any claim under this chapter
that:
(1) the nonconformity, defect, or condition does not substan-
tially impair the use, value, or safety of the motor vehicle; and
(2) the nonconformity, defect, or condition is the result of abuse,
neglect or unauthorized modification or alteration of the motor
vehicle by the buyer.
Sec. 19. This chapter does not apply to any buyer who has not first
resorted to an informal proceeding established by a manufacturer or in
which a manufacturer participates if."175
(1) the procedure is certified by the attorney general as comply-
ing in all respects with C.F.R. 703;"' and
174. Some states provide by statute or regulation for the precise content of this notice.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-179(g) (West Supp. 1988); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §
7N (5) (West Supp. 1984-85); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.665(5)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
The Minnesota statute requires as a condition to resale that the manufacturer expressly war-
rant the returned car for twelve months or 12,000 miles.
175. Almost all states' lemon laws provide that if a manufacturer sets up an informal
dispute resolution mechanism that conforms to the federal regulations for such mechanism, the
consumer must resort to those arbitration boards before qualifying for the provisions of the
lemon law in a court action. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(e)(3) (West Supp. 1988); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 121- para. 1204(a) (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. 325 F. 665 (West Supp.
1988) (requires only that IDSM "substantially comply" with FTC's regulations). But see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 25-2-103(1)(d) (1986). Besides Texas, North Carolina is the only state not to
provide for use of an IDSM sponsored by the manufacturer. Id. § 25-2-103(l)(d). North Car-
olina's lemon law, however, is not a "true" lemon law in that it merely changes the U.C.C.
definition of "seller" to include a manufacturer of a motor vehicle who makes an express war-
ranty, thereby eliminating privity problems for the buyer. Id. § 25-2-103(l)(d).
176. For the IDSM procedure to qualify under the regulatory scheme, the mechanism
must be provided free of charge to the consumer and must be insulated from any influence by
the warrantor. The minimum requirements, as set out in subsection (b), include:
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(2) the buyer has received adequate written notice from the
manufacturer of the existence of the procedure. Adequate writ-
ten notice includes the incorporation of the informal dispute set-
tlement procedure into the terms of the written warranty to
which the motor vehicle does not conform.
Sec. 20. This chapter does not limit the rights or remedies that are
otherwise available to a buyer under any applicable provisions of law. 177
Sec. 21. A buyer may bring a civil action to enforce this chapter in
any circuit or superior court.
Sec. 22. A buyer who prevails in any action brought under this chap-
ter is entitled to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggre-
gate amount of cost and expenses, including attorney's fees 17 8 based on ac-
(1) a statement of the availability of the IDSM;
(2) the name and address of the Mechanism, or the name and a telephone number of the
Mechanism which consumers may use without charge;
(3) a statement of any requirement that the consumer resort to the Mechanism before
exercising rights or seeking remedies created by Title I of the Act, together with the
disclosure that if a consumer chooses to seek redress by pursuing rights and remedies not
created by Title I of the Act, resort to the Mechanism would not be required by any
provision of the Act; and
(4) a statement, if applicable, indicating where further information on the Mechanism
can be found in manuals accompanying the product.
16 C.F.R. § 703.3(b) (1988).
177. As a means of promoting goodwill and encouraging arbitration in lieu of legal ac-
tion, contracts between the manufacturer and the mechanism make the arbitration binding on
the manufacturer but not on the consumer. To allow an adverse finding of the arbitration
panel to be introduced into evidence will have adverse affects to the consumer, thus in effect
"binding" the consumer to the situation, if not by the precise terms of the agreement. See, e.g.,
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (provides purchaser
using provisions of § 6.07 with trial de novo after exhaustion of administrative remedies in
action only against manufacturer or distributor, not dealer); see also Administrative Proce-
dure and Texas Register Act, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19(c) (Vernon
Supp. 1988) (if manner of review authorized is by trial de novo, court "may not admit in
evidence the fact of prior agency action or the nature of that action").
178. Allowing recovery for attorney fees and double damages when the consumer
prevails will encourage the manufacturers to settle before litigation when the consumer has a
bona fide lemon law claim. There are several policy interests behind the recovery of attorney
fees and double damages. First, the recovery of attorney fees encourages injured consumers to
bring legal actions to enforce their rights under the lemon law statutes. Often the amount of
pecuniary loss is small compared with the cost of litigation. Thus, the recovery must be large
enough to give consumers an incentive to bring suit. The award of attorney fees encourages
attorneys to pursue consumers' claims where the anticipated monetary recovery would not jus-
tify the expense of legal action.
Second, the consumer who sues under the statute acts as a "private attorney general" to
enforce the consumers' rights set forth in the statutes. Thus, the consumer not only enforces
his or her individual rights, but the aggregate effect of individual suits enforces the public's
rights.
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tual time expended by the attorney, determined by the court to have been
reasonably incurred by the buyer for or in connection with the commence-
ment and prosecution of the action.
Sec. 23. (a) An action brought under this chapter must be com-
menced within two (2) 17 years following the date the buyer first reports the
nonconformity to the manufacturer, its agent, or authorized dealer.
(b) When the buyer has commenced an informal dispute
settlement procedure described in Section 19 of this chap-
ter, the two (2) year period specified in subsection (a) is
tolled during the time the informal dispute settlement pro-
cedure is being conducted.' 80
V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED MODEL STATE LEMON LAW
In general, the proposed model lemon law will provide the new car
buyer with several important advantages over existing law, including the
U.C.C. and the Magnuson-Moss Act. Most importantly, the law is designed
to assure the consumer a refund or replacement remedy where the manu-
facturer is unable, within a reasonable time, to remedy a substantial defect
breaching an express or implied warranty. 8 Further, the proposed model
statute establishes objective standards to determine when a manufacturer
has had a reasonable opportunity to remedy any defect, a problem area
under existing law.'82 Finally, by encouraging the use of non-judicial dis-
pute resolution mechanisms, the proposed law potentially allows consumers
a less expensive and less time-consuming alternative to litigation in resolv-
ing problems concerning new cars.' 83
Third, consumer suits have the effect of deterring impermissible conduct by manufactur-
ers because, if they violate the statutes, they will be subject to costs, including attorney fees.
Nicks, supra note 142, at 48.
179. See, e.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.72 (Baldwin Supp. 1987). If the motor
vehicle has been returned under the provisions of the statute, whether as a result of legal
action or of an informal dispute settlement proceeding, the vehicle may not be resold in the
state unless the manufacturer provides the same express warranty offered to the original pur-
chaser for a term of twelve months or 12,000 miles, whichever is earlier, and the manufacturer
provides to the consumer a document stating that the vehicle was returned to the manufac-
turer as a "lemon." Id.
180. This provision, which is followed in six states, prevents a statute of limitations from
running before a decision is rendered by the dispute mechanism. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
681.104(5)(a) (West Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 121 A, para. 1204, § 4(b) (Smith-
Hurd 1988); 1985 Miss. LAws 224, § 6; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.573(3) (Vernon Supp. 1988);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-16-7 (1987); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6A-8(c) (1986).
181. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
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A. Adopting a Uniform Standard of Conduct
The manufacturer's compliance with lemon laws can be encouraged by
providing manufacturers with a uniform set of substantive provisions to fol-
low. 8 4 At present, the manufacturer's liability to the consumer varies de-
pending upon the state in which the automobile was purchased.' A car
purchased in one state will be covered by that state's lemon law statute, but
the same car purchased in another state will not be covered by a lemon law
statute.28 This lack of uniformity also appears in the areas of number of
repair attempts allowed and defects which constitute "substantial impair-
ment." As a result, a heavy burden is placed upon manufacturers who at-
tempt to comply with the various substantive provisions of the lemon laws.
Requiring states to adopt uniform operative provisions for their indi-
vidual lemon law statutes will encourage the manufacturers to comply with
the laws.' 87 This will provide new car buyers with fewer disputes, less litiga-
tion, and ultimately less frustration. Once uniform standards are estab-
lished, manufacturers will no longer have the excuse of trying to figure out
what the law is in a particular jurisdiction or trying to determine what the
law requires. 88 Once a manufacturer is confronted with a lemon law claim,
the application of the statute will be the same in all states and there should
be no delay in resolving the problem.
Application of definite guidelines from the F.T.C. for independent dis-
pute settlement mechanisms will also promote manufacturer compliance
with lemon laws.' 8 Under the proposed system, every state court with a
lemon law will know if an arbitration program by a manufacturer is the
type of program a consumer is required to use first. Once the F.T.C. sets
minimum standards for the IDSM's, the state courts will be bound to util-
ize the system before they can entertain a claim brought before them.'90
Many manufacturers currently take the position that nothing in Rule
703 requires arbiters under the IDSM to consider or award lemon law relief
even if the consumer proves the elements of recovery.'' The situation thus
resulting is that, as a prerequisite to court actions, consumers are forced to
184. NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1987, at 27, col. 1.
185. Id. at 26.
186. Id.
187. Presently, manufacturers do not always comply with state lemon laws. Arbiters are
not informed of the provisions of the lemon law statutes and are not informed of the necessity




190. Vogel, supra note 9, at 614. For a detailed discussion of independent dispute settle-
ment mechanism, see supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
191. Note, supra note 53, at 362.
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participate in dispute settlement procedures in which the relief sought is not
available. Also, arbiters are often unaware of the lemon laws and fail to
apply them.' 92
Requiring the IDSM's to meet F.T.C. standards would require arbiters
to apply the lemon laws and the consumers to first resort to that procedure.
Since ninety percent of all claims going through arbitration result in a set-
tlement, this is a definite advantage for consumers. 19 3 Uniform standards
will also force manufacturers to be more conscientious when making deci-
sions regarding defective cars. The standards at the arbitration level will be
more consistent for cars with actual non-conforming defects. Manufacturers
will not be able to randomly dismiss claims at this level because if a claim
is wrongfully dismissed and the consumer is forced into litigation and wins,
double damages19 4 and reasonable attorney fees' 95 are awarded to the
consumer.
B. Allowing Recovery for Breach of an Implied Warranty
Nonconformity, as defined in Section 6 of the model statute, means a
new car's failure to conform to all express or implied warranties which the
failure of substantially impairs the use, market value, or safety of the car to
the consumer. Such a definition is an improvement over current state laws.
Current statutes do not generally cover breach of implied warranties in
their statutes.' 96 Therefore, no guarantee exists that the car will be fit for
the ordinary purpose of driving or will be merchantable. A new car may be
repaired for different defects during the applicable period substantially
more than four times and not come within the limitations of the statute.
Without the same defect occurring four times, under current state statutes,
substantial impairment does not exist.
The term "substantial impairment" presents much difficulty in the
lemon laws of many states both because of its broad definition and because
of the need to use a subjective test in determining whether substantial im-
pairment has resulted. 97 For purposes of the model state statute, substan-
tial impairment will be measured by a more objective standard. Under the
model statute, the buyer must introduce "objective evidence" to demon-
192. Id. at 363.
193. Id.
194. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
195. Id.
196. See supra note 114. Lemon laws generally limit their coverage to the express war-
ranty of the manufacturer. Only Kansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island
extend coverage to both express and implied warranties. 1985 Kan. Sess. Laws 118 § 1(c);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7N (2) (West Supp. 1988); N.Y. REv. STAT. ANN. § 357-
D (1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.2-1(A) (Supp. 1988).
197. Basanta, supra note 82, at 29-30.
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strate that the value to him was actually impaired. 198 By setting guidelines
as to what type of defects constitutes substantial impairment, the statute
will be more effective than current statutes.
Unlike the majority of existing lemon laws, under the model statute
the buyer can demonstrate substantial impairment by proving that the cu-
mulative effect of the five defects and the manufacturer's or dealer's inabil-
ity to repair constitutes a substantial impairment of the value of the goods
to the buyer. 199 The nonconformity may include a cluster or combination of
defects rather than only one defect occurring several times. 00 This is cru-
cial because lemon automobiles often have multiple defects. Sometimes in-
dividual defects alone do not substantially impair the use, value, or safety of
the car, but when such defects are taken together, they may constitute a
substantial impairment. 0 1
C. Clear-Cut Definitions and Statutory Language
As with most statutes, the definitional section of a lemon law is crucial
in determining its scope and coverage. In many ways, the definitions are the
key to the usefulness of the law as a protective device. Including the defini-
tion of all of the terms used in the statute eliminates any uncertainty on the
part of the manufacturers, courts, and consumers in applying the statute.
As a result, decisions of the arbitrators should ultimately be more predict-
able and reliable, and consumers will have more insight into whether they
have a lemon law claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed Model State Lemon Law is a response to inadequacies in
the present legal protections offered to new car buyers, particularly the in-
adequacies in the Uniform Commercial Code and Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act. The law is intended to supplement these laws and to attempt to
correct specific problems encountered by new car buyers in relation to
them.
The lemon law would make significant improvements over existing law.
The consumer's right under the lemon law to receive a refund of the
198. A major defect in most states' lemon laws is that they fail to give a definition of
"substantial impairment," leaving a consumer guessing as to whether he has a cause of action.
State courts impose different standards as to what constitutes substantial impairment, so the
manufacturer is often left guessing also. For a discussion as to distinct categories of noncon-
formity which have been held to constitute substantial impairment see Comment, supra note
39, at 329.
199. U.C.C. § 2-608 (1980).
200. See supra notes 130-33.
201. Id.
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purchase price or a replacement vehicle if the manufacturer is unable,
within a reasonable time, to remedy any substantial breach of an express
warranty, is of particular importance. The purchaser is then assured of the
opportunity to rid himself of the car and either receive a refund or a re-
placement car. The lemon law simplifies and strengthens the refund-or-re-
placement remedy by setting objective criteria for determining when a man-
ufacturer has had a reasonable opportunity to remedy any defect. By
encouraging the creation and use of non-judicial dispute resolution mecha-
nism, the lemon law also may provide consumers with a less expensive and
less time-consuming alternative to litigation when they are faced with a
defective new car.
Several other aspects of the proposed Model State Lemon Law also
improve upon other state lemon laws. First, uniform standards of conduct
enable the manufacturer to comply more fully with the terms of the lemon
law. Second, the standard for proving substantial impairment is objective.
Third, implied warranties of merchantability are included in the lemon law,
so if a consumer has a vehicle with a number of trivial defects which alone
do not constitute substantial impairment he can combine the defects to-
gether and thus prove a substantial impairment of the vehicle. Fourth,
guidelines for the independent dispute settlement mechanism inspire con-
sumer confidence and manufacturer support of such programs. Finally, pre-
cise definition of all terms used in the statute eliminates the ambiguity ex-
isting in current state lemon laws.
With the suggested changes in the current state lemon law statutes,
the proposed model state lemon law would be an improvement over the
remedies currently available to purchasers of defective new automobiles.
These changes would vitalize the model statute, making it an effective
weapon in the consumer's fight to own a defect-free automobile.
VICKI D. RAu
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